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Institutional Bindingness, Power Structure, and Land Expropriation in China
1. Introduction
Many contemporary authoritarian regimes hold seemingly democratic institutions (“quasi-
democratic institutions” henceforth), including political parties, legislatures, and com-
petitive elections (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Gandhi, 2008). Some scholars find that
quasi-democratic institutions — besides preserving authoritarian rule — generate posi-
tive governance outcomes, such as more secure property rights and better public goods
and social welfare provision (e.g., Gandhi, 2008; Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011). This line
of research typically treats quasi-democratic institutions as exogenously determined and
presumes that such institutions, once established, are “binding” in the sense that they
empower non-state actors and constrain the discretionary behavior of authoritarian rul-
ing elites. However, recent studies suggest that quasi-democratic institutions are not
necessarily binding and their bindingness varies across different contexts (Jensen et al.,
2014; Wright, 2008). How does institutional bindingness affect governance outcomes
in authoritarian regimes? Moreover, if institutional bindingness indeed has governance
implications, why does the bindingness of the same institution vary across contexts?
These questions are particularly relevant in China, where some quasi-democratic insti-
tutions and practices have been implemented at the local level while the regime remains
under solid authoritarian rule by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Chinese villages
have adopted competitive direct elections for over three decades, but the exercise of power
by Villagers’ Committees (VCs) — the elected village leadership — is still constrained by
the presence of the village Party branch, the CCP’s grassroots organization. This leads
to a “dual power structure” whereby village governing power is divided between VCs
and Party branches (Oi and Rozelle, 2000; Guo and Bernstein, 2004). In the absence of
clearly-demarcated domains of authority between them, these two types of village leaders
often engage in power struggles against each other. The uncertainty over the locus of
power casts doubt on the ability of elections to empower villagers and constrain inter-
vention by local states, particularly by governments at the county and township levels,
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into village affairs. As a result, depending on the post-election balance of power between
VCs and village Party branches, even free and fair elections are not necessarily binding.
This article examines the institutional bindingness of village elections — operational-
ized in terms of the post-election balance of power between VCs and Party branches —
in the context of land expropriation. For the majority of rural residents, land is the most
important asset because it functions both as a source of income and as a mechanism
of social insurance (Cai, 2016). Over the last two decades, China experienced massive
state-led urbanization, causing over 40 million farmers to be deprived of land and forced
to relocate (Han, 2005). Land expropriation, central to the government’s strategies of
development and capital accumulation, has generated widespread discontent and become
the most important source of social conflict in rural and peri-urban areas (Cui et al., 2015;
Sargeson, 2013). Bargaining and conflicts over compensation for expropriation between
land-losing villagers and the local government provide an ideal analytical perspective to
examine how the balance of power between the two types of village leadership affects
governance outcomes.1
Following the work of Sun et al. (2013), we adopt a principal-agent framework to treat
leaders of VCs and Party branches as agents of villagers and the local state, respectively.
Against the backdrop of contestation between VCs and Party branches, we argue that VC
leaders are more likely to take the side of villagers’ against local officials in the process
of land expropriation. Land-losing villagers are thus better off when elected VCs hold
substantial authority in village politics. We further contend that the balance of power
between VCs and Party branches is not exogenously determined; rather, it is shaped by
political bargaining between local governments and ordinary villagers. The outcomes of
these political agreements depend on the relative bargaining power of the two sides.
Using survey data, our empirical analysis finds that in villages where VCs are the
dominant leader or share power equally with Party branches, villagers’ interests are better
represented, negotiations with the local government on land-taking compensation are
more likely to take place, and villagers are more satisfied with the compensation they
received for land expropriation. We also show that the balance of power between VCs
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and Party branches is partly determined by the fiscal and political capacity of the local
government vis-a`-vis the villagers. When a village is fiscally more dependent on the local
government, the Party branch is more likely to hold stronger authority. In contrast, when
villagers can impose credible threats on local states through collective action, especially in
the presence of large-scale land expropriations, VCs are more likely to obtain an advantage
over Party branches.
These findings suggest that when investigating quasi-democratic institutions in au-
thoritarian regimes, it is insufficient to focus only on the presence or procedures of insti-
tutions. Institutional bindingness deserves careful research attention. Moreover, institu-
tional bindingness is not exogenously determined — it depends on the political context
and particularly the political bargaining between regime elites and social actors. When
acting collectively, ordinary citizens who typically do not enjoy strong de jure political
power could affect the outcomes of such bargaining and push quasi-democratic institu-
tions to benefit their interests.
This research makes an important contribution to the literature on how local demo-
cratic institutions affect governance performance in developing countries. Empirical
evidence based on democratic countries has shown positive associations between local
democratic institutions and governance outcomes (e.g., Besley and Burgess, 2002; Olken,
2010). Studies on village elections in China have similarly argued that these elections
promote better public goods provision and reduce corruption and inequality (Zhang et al.,
2004; Luo et al., 2007; Martinez-Bravo et al., 2011; Wang and Yao, 2007; Shen and Yao,
2008; Brandt and Turner, 2007). This research suggests that the governance effects of
local democratic institutions in authoritarian contexts are contingent on institutional
bindingness, which is subject to political bargaining between regime elites and social ac-
tors. Uncertainty in terms of institutional bindingness may significantly shape how local
democratic institutions function in authoritarian regimes and potentially undermine their
benefits.
Our research also contributes to the burgeoning literature on the politics of land and
urbanization in China. The dominant research paradigm in this literature theorizes land
3
disputes as politicized bargains between local governments and land-losing citizens (Hsing,
2010; Whiting, 2011; Rithmire, 2015). While scholars have long noted the important
intermediary roles village leaders play in such bargains, few studies have explicitly tested
how village politics affects the process and outcome of land expropriation.2 By showing
that the balance of power between VCs and village Party branches significantly shapes
land bargaining outcomes, this study advances our understanding of the politics of land-
related disputes and conflict in China.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on quasi-
democratic institutions under authoritarianism with a focus on institutional bindingness.
Section 3 contextualizes the concept of institutional bindingness by introducing the “dual
power structure” in rural China. Section 4 theorizes how the balance of power between
VCs and village Party branches affects the process and outcome of land expropriation
and how it is endogenously determined by the bargaining power between local state and
villagers. Section 5 provides empirical evidence using survey data. Section 6 concludes.
2. Institutional bindingness under authoritarianism
It is common for contemporary authoritarian regimes to hold some forms of quasi-
democratic institutions, such as political parties, legislatures, and elections. Existing
research argues that, rather than promoting transitions to democracy, quasi-democratic
institutions serve important functions for autocrats to stay in power. These functions
include co-opting political elites or opposition groups in the society (Magaloni, 2006;
Gandhi, 2008; Wright, 2008; Blaydes, 2010; Boix and Svolik, 2013), signaling regime
strength and popularity (Magaloni, 2006; Simpser, 2013), attracting private investment
(Wright, 2008; Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011), and conveying information about the chal-
lenges facing autocrats (Malesky and Schuler, 2010; Manion, 2016). Scholars introduced
new concepts such as “pseudo-democracy” (Diamond et al., 1995: 8), “disguised dicta-
torship” (Brooker, 2014: 228), “hegemonic electoral authoritarianism” and “competitive
authoritarianism” (Diamond, 2002: 29-32; Levitsky and Way, 2002: 53) to capture these
new forms of authoritarian rule.
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Besides serving the interests of authoritarian rulers, quasi-democratic institutions
could also improve governance outcomes and citizens’ well-being. Scholars have identified
two mechanisms for such effects. First, by incorporating more actors into political and
policymaking processes, quasi-democratic institutions are able to constrain state preda-
tion, enhance the responsiveness and accountability of office-holders, and produce policies
that benefit a broader population (Boix, 2003; Gandhi, 2008; Malesky and Schuler, 2010;
Manion, 2014; Harding, 2015; Rosenzweig, 2015). Second, quasi-democratic institutions
also act as the platforms on which ruling regime elites establish patronage ties with cit-
izens. Through these institutions, authoritarian regimes expand particularistic benefits
beyond the narrow circle of ruling elites to at least part of the society (Lust-Okar, 2005;
Magaloni, 2006; Blaydes, 2010).
This body of research commonly presumes that quasi-democratic institutions, to some
extent, empower non-state actors and hold the behaviors of ruling regime elites in check.
In other words, institutions are presumed to be “binding,” implying that they credi-
bly transfer limited but real political power from elites to other social groups that are
originally excluded from political processes. For example, the co-optation theory argues
that authoritarian rulers – especially in countries with scarce natural resources – need
the cooperation of social and business groups to promote economic growth and maintain
regime stability. Elections and legislatures whereby these groups are entitled to a formal
say in the policymaking process are capable of promoting such cooperation (Gandhi and
Przeworski, 2007). The formal political and policy influence attached to legislative seats
is central to this logic, because without meaningful power these elected positions and
legislative seats would degenerate into merely rent-seeking opportunities (Blaydes, 2010).
However, the above presumption — institutions are binding — deserves further scrutiny.
Scholars have shown that elections and legislatures are incapable of effectively constrain-
ing the dictatorial power of authoritarian ruling elites in many contexts (e.g., Wright,
2008). Authoritarian regimes can establish reserved domains and restrictions to obstruct
elected officials and legislators from exercising meaningful power, often through extra-
constitutional means. For example, elected legislatures in Egypt under Mubarak were
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highly circumscribed and lacked independent policymaking power; as a result, they were
incapable of compelling the state to make policy compromises to citizens (Blaydes, 2010).
Similarly, Jensen et al. (2014) found that multi-party legislatures only reduce the risk of
property expropriation by corporate insiders but not by the state, indicating the lim-
ited role that legislatures play in constraining the state. In military regimes, the power
of elected officials are often heavily circumscribed under so-called “guided democracy,”
whereas the real power is concentrated in a few military commanders instead of an elected
civilian leadership (Collier and Levitsky, 1997).
The limited existing discussion on the bindingness issue of quasi-democratic institu-
tions shows that the degree of bindingness depends on regime types. Wright and coau-
thors (2008; 2017) argue that legislatures are more likely to be binding in single-party
and military regimes than personalist regimes and monarchies and in resource-poor than
resource-rich countries. However, this approach has two major shortcomings. First, it
overlooks potential and nuanced differences among regimes of the same type. For ex-
ample, People’s Congresses in China — a country that, following Wright’s logic, falls
into the categories of resource-poor and single-party rule — are not binding legislatures
because they have been long regarded as powerless “rubber stamps.” Despite being more
assertive, national and local People’s congresses still primarily serve as a channel for the
regime to collect information about society rather than a platform for non-state actors
to challenge the decisions of the state (Manion, 2016; Truex, 2016). Second, institu-
tional bindingness may also vary at the subnational level, which cannot be captured by
cross-national analysis.
3. Bindingness of village elections in China
This section considers the bindingness of village elections — a quasi-democratic practice
widely adopted in China but its actual significance in village politics exhibits significant
subnational variation. As defined earlier, bindingness refers to the extent to which institu-
tions empower non-state actors and constrain the discretionary behavior of authoritarian
ruling elites. In the context of Chinese villages, we operationalize bindingness in terms of
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the balance of power between elected Villagers’ Committees and village Party branches.
More specifically, we view village elections as binding if and only if elected VC leaders are
able to hold substantial power rather than simply being subordinate to the authorities
of Party branches and the local government. The bindingness of village elections varies
significantly across localities.
Village elections were first introduced in the early 1980s when the People’s Com-
mune governance system became dysfunctional or paralyzed as a result of agricultural
de-collectivization.3 Villagers’ Committees were written into China’s Constitution as
elected mass organizations of self-government (Article 111) in 1982. The rules and regula-
tions of village elections are governed by the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees, which
was implemented on a trial basis in 1987, fully adopted in 1998, and further amended
in 2010. According to the Organic Law, the Villagers’ Committee, usually consisting of
three to seven members, is directly elected by villagers every three years.
The existing literature argues that elections have positive effects on various aspects
of village governance. Survey research shows that elections are able to strengthen the
accountability of village officials (Manion, 1996; Kennedy et al., 2004), reduce their preda-
tory and rent-seeking behavior (Brandt and Turner, 2007), prompt them to side with ordi-
nary villagers in resisting unpopular state policies (Li, 2001), and boost public confidence
in their trustworthiness and integrity (Manion, 2006). Scholars also find that elections
increase expenditure on public goods and services (Zhang et al., 2004; Luo et al., 2007;
Martinez-Bravo et al., 2011; Wang and Yao, 2007) and reduce income inequality (Shen
and Yao, 2008).
While village elections have to some extent weakened the direct control of the party-
state over village affairs, it would be wrong to assume that elected VCs have become the
sole or even primary locus of power within villages. In particular, Party branches, which
are not subject to popular elections, remain strongly influential in village governance.
The co-existence of VCs and Party branches as two separate loci of power leads to what
scholars have called “dual-power structure” (Oi and Rozelle, 2000; Guo and Bernstein,
2004). China’s laws, including the Organic Law, are ambiguous about the roles and re-
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sponsibilities of Party branches and VCs in village affairs. According to the Organic Law,
for example, VCs are in charge of “public affairs and public goods of the village” and “the
management of land and other collective property” (Articles 2 and 8). Party branches
should “support villagers in developing self-governance and exercising their democratic
rights;” however, they also “serve a leadership core (lingdao hexin) role in village gov-
ernance” (Article 4). Such ambiguity and contradictions also exist extensively in the
regulations issued by subnational governments (see Alpermann, 2009).
In practice, the balance of power between Party branches and VCs varies enormously
across villages. Li (1999) found in a survey of 10,041 respondents in seven provinces in
1997 that 13% of the respondents believed that the ultimate authority in village affairs
rested with the village head, while 55% thought it was on the Party secretary. Among
115 villages surveyed in 2004, Sun et al. (2013) found that 50% of the villages had Party
branches that wielded the ultimate authority and 32% had VCs with this authority either
solely or shared with the Party branch. An another 18% of villages adopted a practice
known as concurrent office holding (yijiantiao) where a single individual is selected to
head both the VC and the Party branch.4 These findings demonstrate that in many
villages VCs still have not been able to challenge the dominant position of Party branches
in village affairs.
Scholars of Chinese politics have indeed noted that village elections, even implemented
with high-quality procedures, are not necessarily binding. A special issue of Journal of
Contemporary China (2009, Vol. 18, Issue 60) on village elections in China emphasizes
the fact that focusing on the presence of elections or the quality of electoral procedures
is insufficient. The contributors of this special issue recommended a new research agenda
that places elections within a broader political context of the local power structure. In
the special issue, O’Brien and Han (2009) argue that village elections have changed the
way in which village leaders gain power, but access to power does not necessarily lead
to effective exercise of power, drawing scholarly attention to the post-election balance of
power between VCs and village Party branches. Manion (2009) similarly encourages an
effort to “push forward with a new wave of scholarship on village democratization, one
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that systematically investigates the contextual effect of the local power configuration on
governance” (p.382).
Extending this new research agenda, we seek to examine how the post-election balance
of power between VCs and village Party branches affects village governance, and how the
structure is shaped by interactions between local states and ordinary villagers. It should
be pointed out that we do not and have no intention to deny the importance of elections;
in fact, we believe holding regular and competitive elections is essential to improve village
governance. However, we demonstrate that this effect is conditional upon the extent to
which elected village leaders hold sufficiently meaningful power to constrain the behavior
of local party-state and its agents.
4. Balance of power and land expropriation in China
We analyze the impact of the balance of power between VCs and Party branches on vil-
lage governance outcomes in the context of land expropriation. Land expropriation arises
from the unique property rights arrangement in rural China where land cultivated by in-
dividual households is owned by village collectives.5 Collective land ownership features
what Peter Ho (2001) calls “deliberate institutional ambiguity” — the term “collective”
is intentionally vague in the Land Administration Law (LAL) in order to solidify state
control over rural land. Moreover, LAL gives the state the right to expropriate collective
land for “public use,” the scope of which is also poorly defined. This institutional ambi-
guity by design leaves significant room for the abuse of power by governments at various
levels to expropriate rural land and convert it into non-agricultural use, such as indus-
trial and infrastructure projects as well as lucrative real-estate development. What’s
worse, the government typically compensates land-losing farmers on the basis of their
land’s original use (i.e., agriculture or rural housing), but subsequently auctions off the
expropriated land at the market price based on its future value. As a result, massive
profits go to the coffers of the government. The scale of land expropriation is massive.
It is estimated that land expropriation accounts for the loss of around 200 thousand
hectares of farmland and the relocation of more than three million rural residents every
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year (Han, 2005). Inadequate compensation, forced eviction, and land-related corruption
are rampant throughout China, escalating conflict between land-losing farmers and local
governments (Ong, 2014). Consequently, land disputes have become the primary source
of social unrest (Yu, 2009).6
While land expropriations are by and large state behavior — they are decided by
governments at or above the county level and implemented by local officials at county or
township levels — their outcomes, to some extent, depend on the attitudes and behaviors
of village leaders, particularly VC Chairs and village Party secretaries. Village leaders
play multiple roles in the process of land expropriation. For example, local officials rely
on them to convene village assemblies and/or public hearings, to announce government
decisions and compensation standards, and to persuade villagers to give up their land.
When negotiations occur between local governments and villagers, village leaders are
also key participants. They also carry out some detailed work such as land surveying
and valuation. Moreover, in many cases, village leaders also play a key role in deciding
the use and allocation of the part of the compensation paid to village collectives. All
these roles allow village leaders to exert direct or indirect influence over the amount of
compensation individual villagers could obtain (Fu, 2014).
There is considerable variation in the attitudes and behavior adopted by village lead-
ers when expropriating land. Some leaders dutifully implement upper-level government
directives regardless of the interests or preferences of villagers (Cai, 2003). They withhold
important information, urge villagers to accept low compensation, and prevent villagers
from mobilizing collectively by leveraging their formal and informal influence within vil-
lage, sometimes in the form of coercion (Sargeson, 2013; Mattingly, 2016). By contrast,
leaders in other villages help negotiate with the local officials for higher compensation on
behalf of villagers. They even take leadership roles in collective action (e.g., petition and
protest) against land expropriation.7
We argue that the role of village leaders in land expropriation depends critically
on the balance of power between VCs and Party branches. Following the work of Sun
et al. (2013), we adopt a principal-agent framework to treat leaders of VCs and Party
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branches as the agent of villagers and the local state, respectively. These two types of
village leaders derive authority from different sources. As discussed earlier, VC leaders
are popularly elected while Party branch leaders are either appointed by the township
Party committee or selected by the other village Party members through a vote. Even
when voting by party members is required, there are various channels by which township
authorities can exert an undue influence on the ultimate result (e.g., by controlling the
candidate nomination process). More importantly, village Party branches, as part of the
centralized Party hierarchy, are obliged to carry out orders from above, regardless of how
their leaders are selected.8
Various sources of authority between VCs and Party branches strongly shape the
willingness of village leaders to defend the interests of villagers in land expropriation.
Land expropriation is essentially a zero-sum game: the more land-taking compensation
villagers receive, the less revenue local governments can retain. When the conflict of
interest occurs between villagers and local governments, village Party secretaries, who rely
more on the political support of the local government to retain their leadership positions
and authority, are more likely to favor the interest of the local government by seeking to
persuade, or even force, villagers to accept the state-set compensation and give up their
land. In contrast, VC leaders rely more on the popular support of their constituencies —
village voters. Therefore, they are more likely to protect the interest of their village in the
process of land expropriation. This is primarily done by helping villagers negotiate with
the local government for better compensation packages. As discussed earlier, holding even
free and fair elections does not necessarily mean that elected leaders enjoy real power in
the post-election dual-power structure. As a result, VC leaders are more likely to shape
land expropriation outcomes when they hold meaningful power vis-a`-vis Party branch
leaders. We therefore expect that:
Hypothesis 1: In villages where VCs hold substantial power, village leaders
are more likely to represent the interest of villagers during land expropriation,
and land-losing villagers are more likely to receive better compensation and
resettlement deals.
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The above hypothesis suggests that the balance of power between VCs and village
Party branches plays a key role in shaping the process and outcomes of land expropriation.
It is then straightforward to probe how the balance of power varies across villages. In
other words, if the configuration of power within the village leadership is an important
determinant of governance outcomes, why does such power vary in the first place?
The principal-agent framework we adopt also sheds light on the sources of variation in
the balance of power between VCs and village Party branches. Such balance of power, we
argue, is partially driven by the political bargaining between their respective principals,
namely local state authorities and ordinary villagers. On the one hand, to ensure imple-
mentation of state policies from above — especially those unpopular mandates such as
birth control and land expropriation, township governments rely heavily on village Party
branches and have strong incentives to strengthen the latter’s authority in villages. One
instrument that township governments could draw upon is the allocation of government
funds. The abolition of the centuries-old agricultural tax in the early 2000s significantly
reduced village income, making many villages financially dependent on the township gov-
ernment. This is especially true for poor villages, which have fewer sources to generate
income and have to rely on township governments to pay for public goods and services as
well as the salaries of village cadres. As one VC chair explained in an interview, “When
he [the Party secretary] went to the township government with requests, he was always
treated well. If I were to go, they would just ignore me.”9 The dependence of villages on
fiscal resources controlled by the local government therefore strengthens the prestige and
authority of Party secretaries as opposed to VCs.
On the other hand, villagers are strongly motivated to strengthen the authority of
VCs, who they trust more, especially when large-scale land expropriations cause serious
damage to their interests and thereby increase their political activism (Sargeson, 2016).
Through collective actions, sometimes under the leadership and support of elected village
leaders, villagers are able to impose credible threats on local officials (Wang, 2012). The
most common form of collective action by land-losing villagers is what O’Brien and Li
(2006) have called “rightful resistance,” by which villagers organize petitions to upper-
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level governments and use state laws and policies to legitimize their resistance against
the illegal behavior of local governments. Local officials are evaluated by the Party based
on their governance performance in various aspects, one of which relates to maintaining
social stability. Failure to fulfill the mandate of maintaining stability could have detri-
mental consequences for the career prospects of local officials. As a result, resistance by
villagers has potential to trigger career-concerned government officials to make a policy
compromise and in some situation lead to a broader policy change through which to
address grievances from below (Heurlin, 2016). Moreover, in the presence of large-scale
land expropriations, local officials who are concerned about social stability are less likely
to act blatantly in favor of Party branches.
The extent to which local governments and Party branches make concessions also
depends on the ability of villagers to mobilize more participants. Large-scale collective
action impose greater pressure on local officials, thereby making concessions more likely.
Also, the prestige of village Party secretaries who act as arms of the township government
becomes weakened in the midst of popular resistance, providing politically savvy VC
leaders with an opportunity to compel Party secretaries to share power (Sun et al., 2013).
In short, we expect the political bargaining between local governments and villagers to
affect the balance of power between VCs and Party branches in the following ways:
Hypothesis 2a: The fiscal control of local governments over villages empow-
ers Party branches vis-a`-vis VCs in the balance of power between VCs and
village Party branches.
Hypothesis 2b: Large-scale land expropriations empower VCs vis-a`-vis Party
branches in the balance of power between VCs and village Party branches.
Hypothesis 2c: Large-scale collective petitions empower VCs vis-a`-vis Party
branches in the balance of power between VCs and village Party branches.
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5. Empirical analysis
Our data consists of two recent surveys, conducted by the same research team in 2008
and 2009, respectively. The 2009 survey was a household survey that randomly selected
farmers from 62 villages in the peri-urban areas of 12 cities, allowing us to test the first
hypothesis. However, the survey fails to generate the village aggregates that are necessary
to test the second set of hypotheses. In response, our analysis relies on the 2008 survey
within which village-level data was collected from 120 villages in six provinces. A more
detailed description about the two surveys can be found in Appendix A.
(a) Impact of post-election balance of power on land expropriation
We used the 2009 survey to examine how the post-election balance of power between
VCs and Party branches affects the process and outcomes of land expropriation. The
main dependent variables are constructed based on land-losing villagers’ self-reported
attitudinal responses to the following survey questions. First, “how much do you agree
that village leaders stood for the interest of villagers in land expropriation?” Second,
“how satisfied were you with the compensation and settlement arrangements that your
household received in land expropriation?” Responses to both questions were measured
on a five-level scale with higher values indicating more satisfaction.
We also construct another dependent variable — whether negotiations about com-
pensation occurred between villagers and the local government, which captures whether
the process of land expropriation is favorable to the benefits of villagers. In land ex-
propriations, local officials and villagers often negotiate about compensation, and such
negotiations could take place either collectively between local officials and a group of
village representatives or individually between officials and individual households. Wang
(2013) found that land-losing villagers received better compensation when such negotia-
tions occurred. Our fieldwork in Yueqing, Wenzhou in eastern China suggests that VC
leaders often play a key role in the negotiation process and are more likely than Party
secretaries to take the side of villagers. They could, for example, formulate bargaining
strategies based on the information and experience they had accumulated through previ-
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ous engagement with the local government. They could also coordinate collective action
among villagers to exert pressure on the local government.10 We expect that negotia-
tions about compensation are more likely to occur when VC rather than Party branch
leaders hold substantial power. To capture negotiations, we construct a variable based
on the survey question, “Was there a negotiation on land-taking compensation with the
local government when your land was expropriated?” Individual responses were coded
dichotomously. Table 1 provides a snapshot of the dependent variables aggregated to the
city level, suggesting significant variation in all three measures across cities.
Table 1: Description of main dependent variables by cities
City
Number of
Respondents
Number of
Land-losing
Households
Satisfaction1 Interest2 Negotiation3
Wenzhou 81 59 2.17 2.74 56%
Ningbo 102 90 2.73 3.18 7%
Wuxi 101 76 3.28 3.89 27%
Sanhe 108 53 3.34 3.51 57%
Weifang 109 58 4.48 4.40 66%
Jinan 102 95 3.41 3.68 42%
Guangzhou 104 33 2.55 3.30 48%
Zhongshan 86 26 3.15 3.63 53%
Dongguan 90 35 2.71 3.59 21%
Chongqing 106 61 2.80 3.24 37%
Nanchong 108 98 3.23 3.62 46%
Chengdu 111 108 3.39 3.84 79%
Source: 2009 survey.
Note: 1 Satisfaction measured using the question, “How satisfied were you with
the compensation and settlement arrangements that your household received in
land expropriation?” Answers measured on a five-level scale (5=strongly agree;
4=agree; 3=neutral; 2=disagree; 1=strongly disagree).
2 Interest measured using the question, “How much do you agree that village leaders
stood for the interest of villagers in land expropriation?” Answers measured on a
five-level scale (5=very satisfied; 4=satisfied; 3=neutral; 2=dissatisfied; 1=very
dissatisfied).
3 Negotiation measured using the question, “Was there a negotiation on land-
taking compensation with the local government when your land was expropriated?”
Answers coded dichotomously (1=yes). Percentage represents the proportion of
respondents in each city who reported that negotiations occurred.
It should be noted that not all villagers who participated in the survey experienced
land expropriation. We dropped those who had never experienced land acquisition in our
analysis. For those villagers who experienced expropriation more than once, we focus
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on the one that, based on respondents’ own judgment, had the largest impact on their
household.
Our main independent variable of theoretical interest, the configuration of power
between Party branches and VCs, is measured using the survey question, “Who is/was
in charge of public affairs in your village?” Both VC and Party branch leaders face
a three-year term limit. The question was asked twice: once for the leader currently
in office when the survey was conducted, and the other for the leader in the previous
term. Survey respondents were asked to choose from the following three options, 1=
Party branch assumes the dominant leadership role (including those serving concurrently
as Party secretary and village head, i.e., yijiantiao);11 2=VC assumes the dominant
leadership role; and 3=Party branch and VC share the leadership responsibilities.12
We construct two measures for the balance of power between VCs and party branches.
While the survey was conducted at the individual household level, the balance of power
occurs at the village level and therefore requires the data to be aggregated at the village
level. We formulated two aggregates, one continuous and one binary, using information
reported by all villagers in the survey rather than just land-losing villagers. The continu-
ous aggregate (Measure 1) uses the proportion of respondents who reported VC assuming
the leadership role either solely or shared with Party branches in a village (i.e., combining
those who answered 2 and 3).13 The binary aggregate (Measure 2) uses the plurality rule
in the process of data aggregation. For example, if in a village 57% of survey respondents
reported that their VC is in charge of village affairs either alone or shared with the Party
branch, Measure 1 of village power balance will be coded as .57 and Measure 2 will be
coded as 1. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the two measures further aggregated
at the city level, suggesting considerable regional variation. For example, in Wenzhou,
Zhejiang province, land-losing farmers in all of the villages surveyed reported VCs were
in charge of village affairs, whereas VCs in Jinan, Shandong province were only in charge
in one of the five villages surveyed.
Our control variables include the size of the respondent’s household, whether his or
her family belongs to a major clan of the village, whether his or her family member is a
16
Table 2: Balance of power aggregated by city
City Number of Balance of power
villages selected Measure 11 Measure 22
into each city Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Wenzhou 5 0.95 0.07 1.00 0.00
Ningbo 5 0.33 0.19 0.20 0.45
Wuxi 5 0.49 0.20 0.40 0.55
Sanhe 5 0.45 0.18 0.40 0.55
Weifang 5 0.55 0.12 0.60 0.55
Jinan 5 0.36 0.18 0.20 0.48
Guangzhou 6 0.63 0.18 0.50 0.55
Zhongshan 6 0.73 0.18 0.83 0.41
Dongguan 5 0.84 0.03 1.00 0.00
Chongqing 5 0.65 0.20 0.60 0.55
Nanchong 5 0.63 0.14 0.60 0.55
Chengdu 5 0.54 0.15 0.40 0.55
Source: 2009 survey.
Note: 1 Measure 1 is a continuous measure that ranges from 0 to 1.
2 Measure 2 is a dichotomous measure. More details about the variable
construction are available in Appendix D.
village cadre or a Party member, whether his or her family member has a non-farming job,
size of the expropriated land,14 year of land expropriation, and whether house demolition
was involved in land expropriation. Table 3 provides summary statistics.
Table 3: Summary statistics of control variables
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Cadre 432 0.07 0.25 0 1
Party membership 432 0.31 0.46 0 1
Major clan 432 0.35 0.48 0 1
Household size 432 3.84 1.42 1 8
Non-agricultural employment 432 0.59 0.49 0 1
Size of expropriated land (≥ 2mu1) 432 0.34 0.48 0 1
Demolition 432 0.65 0.48 0 1
Note: 1Mu is a Chinese unit of measurement, with 1 mu=1/15 hectares.
Source: The 2009 survey.
Table 4 reports the regression results. The coefficients for the balance of power be-
tween VCs and Party branches are positive and statistically significant across all regres-
sions, consistent with the first hypothesis. More specifically, in villages where VCs hold
a primary leadership role either solely or shared with Party branches, villagers are more
17
likely to perceive village leaders standing for their interest during land expropriation and
more satisfied with the land-taking compensation. Moreover, negotiations with the state
for more land-taking compensation are more likely to take place. On average, shifting
from Party branch dominance to VC dominance or equal power-sharing is associated
with an increase in the belief that village cadres represent the interest of villagers during
land expropriation by 0.21-1.27. The same shift is also associated with an increase in the
level of individual satisfaction by 0.47-1.59, depending on how the balance of power is
measured. We vary model specifications by using ordered logit and hierarchical models
and perform bivariate analysis by excluding all controls. The main results remain robust.
The results are reported in Appendix B.
There may exist some confounding variable (e.g., local governance policies) that ex-
plains both the balance of power and better land expropriation outcomes for villagers,
raising concerns about endogeneity. Our strategy is to adopt an instrumental-variable
approach by taking advantage of the local policy context of China where provincial-
or city-level regulations impact the balance of power between VCs and village Party
branches of all villages within the same city. More specifically, we use the average score
of the balance of power of all sample villages within the same city as a proxy for the
regulatory environment of the city regarding the village balance of power. We provide a
more detailed description of how the instrumental variable is constructed and report the
regression results in Appendix C. Overall, the main results remain hold, demonstrating
the robustness of our findings.
Among the control variables, villagers are more satisfied with land-taking compensa-
tion when the size of the expropriated land is smaller. However, demolition of houses
increase villagers’ satisfaction with the compensation. This is because while the expro-
priation of farmland only requires the approval of village assemblies or village represen-
tatives, demolishing houses requires signing contracts with individual households. This
requirement provides additional bargaining power to villagers. Belonging to a major clan
of the village is positively associated with villagers’ satisfaction with compensation, sug-
gesting that lineage groups have an influence on the distribution of compensation. This
18
Table 4: Explaining the process and outcome of land expropriation
Satisfaction Interest Negotiation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit
Balance of power
(Measure 1)
1.594*** 1.267** 0.522**
(0.551) (0.519) (0.266)
Balance of power
(Measure 2)
0.465*** 0.208* 0.119*
(0.138) (0.122) (0.068)
Cadre 0.151 0.164 0.234 0.249 0.182 0.190
(0.222) (0.219) (0.173) (0.177) (0.119) (0.120)
Party
membership
0.048 0.037 0.004 -0.014 0.063 0.058
(0.124) (0.124) (0.122) (0.123) (0.063) (0.063)
Major clan 0.281** 0.290** 0.039 0.053 0.048 0.052
(0.133) (0.132) (0.128) (0.127) (0.066) (0.066)
Household size -0.056 -0.057 0.033 0.034 0.017 0.016
(0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.022) (0.022)
Non-agricultural
employment
0.194 0.183 0.152 0.151 -0.019 -0.019
(0.140) (0.140) (0.136) (0.136) (0.066) (0.066)
Size of
expropriated land
-0.339*** -0.335** -0.010 -0.023 -0.068 -0.068
(0.130) (0.130) (0.124) (0.127) (0.063) (0.063)
Demolition 0.458** 0.521*** 0.129 0.187 0.229*** 0.252***
(0.177) (0.175) (0.190) (0.189) (0.082) (0.082)
2006 -0.019 -0.024 -0.159 -0.162 0.105 0.102
(0.181) (0.181) (0.169) (0.170) (0.085) (0.085)
2007 -0.119 -0.198 -0.004 -0.051 -0.072 -0.093
(0.170) (0.170) (0.182) (0.183) (0.091) (0.091)
2008 -0.120 -0.082 -0.213 -0.176 0.083 0.098
(0.185) (0.185) (0.161) (0.161) (0.093) (0.092)
Constant 1.084 2.257*** 2.007*** 3.084***
(0.697) (0.438) (0.665) (0.442)
R-squared 0.267 0.271 0.187 0.179
N 421 421 394 394 432 432
City fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Source: 2009 survey.
Note: Marginal effects are reported for logit regressions; robust standard errors are in parentheses
for OLS regressions; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
confirms the observation by Mattingly (2016) that informal institutions within villages
play a strong role in the process of land expropriation.
(b) Political bargaining and balance of power
We further argue that the balance of power between VCs and Party branches is en-
dogenously determined by political bargaining between ordinary villagers and local state
authorities. In the context of land expropriation, the outcomes of such bargains depend
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on the fiscal dependence of villages on the township government (Hypothesis 2a), the
scale of land expropriations (Hypothesis 2b), and the scale of villagers’ collective peti-
tions (Hypothesis 2c). To test these hypotheses, we use the 2008 survey. Unlike the 2009
household survey, the 2008 survey sampled more villages (i.e., 120 villages in 2008 vs. 62
in 2009) and collected richer village-level information. Moreover, while the 2009 survey
only sampled villages that had experienced land expropriation, the 2008 survey selected
villages both with and without land expropriations into the sample, providing more ex-
planatory power. We provide a detailed description of the 2008 survey in Appendix
A.
The dependent variable — how power is divided between VCs and Party branches
— is measured using the survey question, “Who assumes the primary leadership role
in village financial affairs in your village?” This question was answered collectively by a
group of (usually three) “elite villagers,” which often included village electoral committee
members, candidates in the most recent elections, or other villagers who were active
participants of village affairs. Respondents were asked to choose from the following
options: 1= Party branch secretary assumes the dominant leadership role; 2= VC chair
assumes the dominant leadership role; 3= VC chair and Party branch secretary share
leadership responsibilities (power-sharing); 4= Concurrent office-holding. We combine
VC dominance and power-sharing between VCs and Party branches (i.e., answers 2 and
3) into one single category. Among sample villages, 26% were governed under Party
branch dominance, 47% under VC dominance or power-sharing, and the rest 27% under
concurrent office-holding. For now, we leave Party branch dominance and concurrent
office-holding as separate categories, but as illustrated in the results below, these two
categories demonstrate similar patterns and combining them into a single category does
not affect our analysis.
We use three main independent variables to test the three hypotheses respectively.
The fiscal dependence of villages on the township government is measured by the share of
government subsidies in village fiscal expenditure in the last year. To measure the scale of
land expropriations, we created two dummy variables, whether the aggregated amount of
20
land acquired in the village within the past three years exceeded 50 or 100 mu. Both fiscal
dependence and the scale of land expropriations, along with other village socioeconomic
information, are based on interviews conducted with village leaders. To measure the
scale of collective petitions, we created another two dummy variables, whether villagers
organized collective petitions with more than 50 or 100 participants in the past three
years. The information on collective petitions was collected based on individual reports
and aggregated at the village level.
We also include a set of control variables. First, we control for the quality of electoral
procedures because VC leaders who go through freer and fairer elections presumably enjoy
greater prestige and thus stronger political support among villagers. Therefore, elections
that adopt procedures with higher quality could strengthen the authority of VC leaders
vis-a´-vis Party secretaries. We create an index for the quality of elections by adding
up four indicators of election procedures: whether the nomination procedure adopts a
method that permitted individual voters to receive a blank ballot and nominate whomever
they wanted — a method often called “open sea nomination” (haixuan timing) (Pastor
and Tan, 2000); whether roving ballot boxes are banned; whether the secret ballot is
adopted; and whether the proxy voting is banned. The index ranges from 0 to 4. Second,
we also control for several village socioeconomic characteristics, including income per
capita, the size of population, the share of migrant workers who work outside the village
among village labor force,15 and the strength of lineage groups measured by the presence
of ancestral halls.16 Table 5 provides summary statistics.
Given that the dependent variable is a categorical variable taking on three values, we
use multinomial logistic regressions in which VC dominance or power-sharing is set as the
baseline category. In other words, we seek to examine how the main independent variables
affect the likelihood of Party branch dominance and concurrent office-holding. Table 6
reports the results. The coefficients for fiscal dependence are positive and statistically
significant across all model specifications, suggesting that when villages are more fiscally
dependent on the local government, Party branches are more likely to play a primary
leadership role. That is, fiscal subsidies provide local authorities with an instrument to
21
Table 5: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Configruation of power 118 2.01 0.73 1 3
Size of expropriated land (≥ 50 mu) 118 0.15 0.36 0 1
Size of expropriated land (≥ 100 mu) 118 0.11 0.31 0 1
Collective petition (≥ 50 participants) 118 0.23 0.42 0 1
Collective petition (≥ 100 participants) 118 0.14 0.35 0 1
Fiscal dependence 118 0.52 0.37 0 1
Quality of elections 118 1.35 1.12 0 4
Income per capita (log) 118 8.10 0.64 5.30 9.47
Population (log) 118 7.18 0.65 5.08 8.53
Share of migrant workers 118 0.23 0.12 0 0.59
Ancestry hall 118 0.18 0.40 0 1
Source: 2008 survey.
exercise influence on the balance of power between VCs and village Party branches. This
is consistent with Hypothesis 2a. Substantively, when the fiscal dependence of a village on
the township government increases from 0 to 100% (both of which are the most extreme
situations), the likelihoods of Party dominance and concurrent office-holding increase on
average from 21% to 28% and from 15% to 41% respectively, while the likelihood of VC
dominance or power-sharing decreases from 64% to 32%.
The results suggest that when large-scale land expropriations occur and when more
people participate in collective petitions, VCs are more likely to hold substantial power
rather than just being subordinate to Party branches. These results confirm Hypotheses
2b and 2c. Substantively, when the size of land acquired exceeded 50 mu within the
past three years, on average the likelihood of Party branch dominance decreases from
27% to 16%, while the likelihood of VC dominance or power-sharing between Party
branches and VCs increases from 42% to 76% and the likelihood of concurrent office-
holding decreases from 30% to 8%. When villagers organized collective petitions with
more than 50 participants in the past three years, on average of likelihood of Party
branch dominance decreases from 29% to 17%, while the likelihood of VC dominance or
power-sharing increases from 43% to 63% and the likelihood of concurrent office-holding
decreases from 27% to 20%. All these effects are substantial in magnitude.
Among the control variables, the share of migrant workers who work outside the
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village significantly increases the likelihoods of both Party dominance and concurrent
office-holding. A possible explanation is that migrant workers who receive their primary
income outside have fewer economic stakes within their villages and therefore weaker
incentives to act collectively to influence the balance of power within village leadership.
Two caveats about the above results should be pointed out. First, as a robustness
check, we also perform a set of logistic regressions, combining Party branch dominance
and concurrent office-holding into a single category in the dependent variable. The results
are consistent with those in Table 6, thereby providing further evidence for our claim that
the two types of power structure are conceptually closer to each other in terms of their
implications for village governance. Second, collective petitions may be endogenous to
rather than explain the balance of the power. It is possible that local governance contexts,
such as benevolent local officials, simultaneously encourage more powerful VCs and reduce
collective petitions by villagers. Alternatively, villages where villagers are more assertive
and vocal may have more powerful VCs and more petitions at the same time.17 While
both the existing literature and our fieldwork suggest that collective petitions directly
challenge the authority of Party branch secretaries (e.g. Sun et al., 2013), thereby shaping
the balance of power to favor VC leaders, we acknowledge the limitations of our research
and suggest that future research should test these dynamics.
6. Conclusion
This article examines the bindingness of village elections through the lens of land expro-
priation in rural China. We operationalize bindingness by analyzing the post-election
balance of power within village leadership, more specifically the configuration of power
between leaders of VCs and Party branches. Empirical analysis based on survey data
leads to two major findings. First, when VCs hold substantial power, villagers’ interests
are better represented during land expropriation, villagers show greater satisfaction with
their land-taking compensation, and negotiations between villagers and local governments
on land-taking compensation are more likely to take place. Second, the configuration of
power between VCs and Party branches can be understood as political bargaining be-
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tween local states and ordinary villagers. Whereas local states can rely on their control
over fiscal resources to empower Party branches, VCs are more likely to hold substantial
power when villagers face land expropriation and organize collective actions to resist local
state predation.
Our findings help address the theoretical questions raised at the beginning of this
article and have important implications for the scholarship on quasi-democratic institu-
tions under authoritarianism. First, they suggest that binding institutions should not
be taken as given in an authoritarian context. Rather, institutional bindingness is often
questionable due to the manipulation of authoritarian ruling elites. The effect of quasi-
democratic institutions on authoritarian governance is therefore contingent on the degree
of institutional bindingness. These findings are by no means unique in China. In Viet-
nam, for example, local legislators are elected but often “captured” by local state officials
(Malesky et al., 2014); as a result, elected legislators serve primarily as an information
channel for the regime rather than the interest of their constituencies (Malesky et al.,
2012). This research emphasizes the importance of treating institutional bindingness as
a theoretical dimension of quasi-democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes.
Second, we also show that citizens, who are generally viewed as powerless in face
of the authoritarian state, have the ability to shape institutional bindingness in their
favor. Weak or non-binding institutions, whose performance fails to live up to people’s
expectations, nevertheless offer a rallying point for citizens to challenge the decisions of
ruling elites (Distelhorst, 2017). Political activists can build political actions surrounding
institutions, sometimes in an coalition with other state or non-state actors, to pressure
the regime to make more meaningful policy and political concessions (Mertha, 2009).
These actions often take semi-institutionalized (e.g., petitions) or non-institutionalized
(e.g., riots) forms, demonstrating what Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) called the “de
facto power” of citizens and compelling ruling elites to join political bargains with the
society. The outcomes of these bargains depend on the ability of citizens to use collective
actions to impose credible coercive threats against elites, as well as the capacity of the
state to absorb these threats (Lee and Zhang, 2013). These findings support the idea
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that institutions are reflective of the underlying power distribution among key political
actors rather than exogenously determined (Pepinsky, 2013).
Taken together, our findings suggest that it is insufficient to evaluate different author-
itarian regimes based only on the presence (or absence) of quasi-democratic institutions
and the quality of their procedures. It is equally, if not more, important to analyze insti-
tutional bindingness and its variations both across regimes and across subnational units
of the same regime by taking into consideration the contextualized political bargains
among relevant political actors. Because of these variations, regimes that are similarly
labeled as “institutional authoritarianism” or “competitive authoritarianism” may in fact
exhibit vastly different governance patterns.
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Notes
1Unless otherwise specified, the terms, “local state” and “local government”, refer to
the party-state apparatus at county(xian)/district(qu) and township(xiangzhen)/street(jiedao)
levels, which are responsible for the implementation of land expropriation in the major-
ity of cases. It should also be noted that land expropriation is decided and implemented
above the village level where competitive direct elections are held. For readers unfamiliar
with the administrative structure of China, see Lieberthal (1995), Chapter 6.
2One exception is Mattingly (2016), who finds that land taking is more likely to occur
when village leadership overlaps with strong informal institutions (lineage groups).
3For discussion of the historical background of village elections, see Shi (1999).
4Sun et al. (2013) measures village power structure using the survey question, “In
your village, how are public affairs tasks divided between the two committees?” (p. 743).
5For details of land institutions in rural China, see Liu et al. (2010).
6Strictly speaking, land disputes can also arise from other contexts, e.g., reallocation
of land within village collectives or occupation of land by village leaders (Whiting, 2011;
Deininger and Jin, 2009; Brandt et al., 2004). In this study we focus on land expropria-
tions by the local government only.
7Li (2001) and Wang (2012) observe that village leaders can act as leaders of collective
action against other unpopular state policies or practices.
8It should be noted that the above theorization – treating the two types of village lead-
ers as the agents of local state authorities and ordinary villagers respectively – represents
a simplification. In practice, township governments could strengthen their control over
elected VC leaders through various legal or illegal channels (e.g., control over salary and
bonus, illegal manipulation of elections) (Birney, 2014). To the contrary, village Party
leaders can also be accountable to villagers through both informal institutions such as
lineage and religious groups (Tsai, 2007; Xu and Yao, 2015) and formal institutions such
as introducing public participation in the selection of Party branch leaders (Li, 1999).
Nevertheless, the principal-agent framework captures the main difference between VCs
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and Party branches and has proved to be a useful analytical framework (Sun et al., 2013).
9Interview with a VC chair in Jilin province, June 2008.
10Interview with villagers in Yueqing, Wenzhou in Zhejiang province, June 2014.
11We combine concurrent office-holding, or yijiantiao, with Party branch dominance
because the most common practice of implementing yijiantiao is to let Party branch
secretaries participate in VC elections and win the elections to become VC chairs. This
means that VC candidates need to be Party members in the first place, thereby reducing
the pool of eligible candidates. Our interviews suggest that to ensure the implementation
of yijiantiao, local governments often intervene in the nomination of VC candidates and
hold elections only as a legitimizing process (see also Liu and Hou, 2015). Moreover,
regardless of how they are selected, Party branch secretaries as concurrent office-holders
are still subordinate to the centralized Party hierarchy. See O’Brien and Han (2009) for
further discussion.
12The answer “Don’t Know (DK)” was provided in the survey. The DK answers were
dropped in our analysis.
13We combined those who chose 2 and those who chose 3 because the former situation
is relatively rare, only accounting for 9% of all responses. Appendix D provides more
details about construction of the main variables of interest.
14The size of the expropriated land is measured dichotomously. It is coded as 1 if
the expropriated land size is greater than two mu and 0 otherwise. The average size of
expropriated land among households that had experienced land expropriation is 2.2 mu.
15Lu (2014) finds that patterns of rural-urban migration have an impact on both the
type and the quality of village governance.
16Existing studies suggest that informal institutions (such as lineage groups) have im-
portant impacts on village governance (Tsai, 2007; Xu and Yao, 2015; Su et al., 2011;
Mattingly, 2016).
17We are grateful to one reviewer for pointing out these possible mechanisms.
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A. Data Appendix
(a) Twelve-city survey in 2009
The 2009 survey was conducted in the urban peripheries of 12 cities and in villages
that had experienced land expropriation since 2004. We chose the cities from four ma-
jor regions of the country: the Yangtze River Delta (Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces);
the Pearl River Delta (Guangdong Province); the Chengdu-Chongqing region (Sichuan
Province and Chongqing Municipality); and the Bohai Bay Area (Hebei and Shandong
Province). These four regions all experienced rapid urbanization in the last two decades;
as a result, land expropriation was rather prevalent and land-related tensions were rather
acute in these regions (Cui et al., 2015). Among all the cities — including directly ad-
ministrated cities, prefecture-level cities and county-level cities — within each region,
the survey selected three sample cities with different sizes of population, including one
megalopolis, one large city, and one medium- or small-size city. The 12 selected cities
include Ningbo and Yueqing in Zhejiang Province; Wuxi in Jiangsu Province; Sanhe in
Hebei Province; Jinan and Weifang in Shandong Province; Guangzhou, Zhongshan, and
Dongguan in Guangdong Province; Nanchong, and Chengdu in Sichuan Province, and
Chongqing.
In each city, the survey selected five to six villages from the city’s urban peripheries,
such as urban districts (shiqu) in the case of directly administrated and prefecture-level
cities and townships (zhen) or streets (jiedao) in the case of county-level cities. This
resulted in a total of 62 sample villages. In larger cities, the survey focused on a single
urban district, while in smaller cities the sampling frame included all urban districts or
townships/streets to generate a sufficient number of sample villages. Finally, in each
sample village, the survey randomly selected about 20 households in which at least one
adult member was available for interviews. After excluding invalid samples, the final
dataset yields a total of 1,209 households.
The survey collected information on respondents and their family members’ demogra-
phy, employment, party membership, cadre status, perceptions about various aspects of
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village politics, and most importantly, their experiences of land expropriations, compen-
sations they received, and their subjective evaluations about the processes and outcomes
of these land expropriations. In cases where the respondent’s household experienced land
expropriation more than once, the survey asked the respondent to choose answers based
on the experience of the expropriation that had the largest impact on the household.
Among the 1,209 samples, 756 have experienced land expropriation since 2000 and 445
have had such experiences since 2005 (the earliest year for which our survey recorded the
configuration of power in the sample villages).
(b) Six-province survey in 2008
The 2008 survey was conducted in 120 villages in six provinces. The survey first di-
vided the country into six major geographical regions and randomly selected one province
from each region: Fujian, Hebei, Jiangsu, Jilin, Shaanxi and Sichuan were the sample
provinces. Below the provincial level, the survey adopted a multi-stage random sampling
approach. First, all counties of each sample province were ranked by their industrial out-
put value, and five sample counties were drawn using the systematic sampling method.
Then two townships were randomly selected from each county and two villages from each
township. In each village, around 20 households were randomly selected from the official
household registration list provided by the village accountant. One household member
was randomly selected from each sample household. Survey enumerators were sent to
respondents’ home to conduct face-to-face interviews and fill out the standardized ques-
tionnaire. Most importantly to this study, interviews with individual villagers allow us
to collect information about collective petitions that occurred in the villages.
The survey also conducted interviews with village leaders and other “elite villagers”
(villagers who are active participants of village affairs and thus familiar with the situation
of their villages, such as senior villagers, electoral committee members, and/or candidates
of elections) to collect village-level socioeconomic information, electoral procedures and
the configuration of power between VCs and Party branches. Therefore, compared with
the 2009 survey, the 2008 survey collected richer data at the village level. More specif-
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ically, the survey team interviewed one village leader, such as Party secretary, the VC
chair, or the village accountant, in each village to gather basic village socioeconomic in-
formation, such as population, average income level, and share of migrant workers. The
team also interviewed a group of three “elite villagers” in a separate interview. They
were asked to collectively recall the procedures of their village elections as well as the
power structure within the village leadership.
B. Robustness checks for the effects of the balance of power
This section considers three robustness checks for the effects of village power structure on
the processes and outcomes of land expropriations, using alternative model specifications.
Table 7 reports the results of ordered logistic regressions, taking into consideration the
fact that both dependent variables are discrete. Table 8 reports the results of hierarchi-
cal models that controls for village-level random effects. Table 9 reports the results of
bivariate regressions that exclude all control variables. As these results show, the main
results remain hold.
C. An instrumental-variable approach
We adopt an instrumental-variable approach to address the potential endogeneity con-
cerns. Our approach takes advantage of the local policy context of China where provincial-
and city-level regulations shape the balance of power of all villages within the same city.
More specifically, we find that provincial- or city-level governments often issue documents
to regulate the balance of power between VCs and village Party branches within their ju-
risdictions. For example, in Jilin we found that the provincial Party committee explicitly
encouraged concurrent office-holding by issuing administrative documents “suggesting”
that 70 per cent of its villages should adopt concurrent office-holding. Consequently,
concurrent office-holding is more prevalent in Jilin than elsewhere. In several prefectures
in Jiangsu, we found government documents emphasizing the importance of preserving
the Party’s leadership in village affairs. As a result, Party branches are more likely to
hold a dominant authority in most villages of these prefectures. These regulations from
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Table 7: Explaining the outcome of land expropriation (ordered-logit)
Satisfaction Satisfaction Interests Interests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balance of power (Measure 1) 2.592*** 2.354**
(0.892) (0.920)
Balance of power (Measure 2) 0.738*** 0.330
(0.233) (0.236)
Cadre 0.517 0.555 0.446 0.480
(0.396) (0.395) (0.409) (0.411)
Party membership 0.048 0.035 -0.054 -0.077
(0.212) (0.212) (0.220) (0.219)
Major clan 0.417* 0.446** 0.124 0.156
(0.226) (0.225) (0.234) (0.233)
Household size -0.097 -0.095 0.043 0.045
(0.075) (0.075) (0.079) (0.079)
Non-agricultural employment 0.306 0.300 0.311 0.310
(0.221) (0.221) (0.230) (0.231)
Size of expropriated land -0.556*** -0.545** 0.026 0.008
(0.212) (0.212) (0.220) (0.220)
Demolition 0.733*** 0.836*** 0.239 0.344
(0.282) (0.280) (0.304) (0.300)
2006 -0.042 -0.065 -0.264 -0.271
(0.283) (0.284) (0.291) (0.292)
2007 -0.214 -0.353 -0.107 -0.193
(0.296) (0.297) (0.323) (0.323)
2008 -0.255 -0.201 -0.482 -0.420
(0.314) (0.313) (0.318) (0.316)
Cut-off point 1 0.985 -0.929 0.022 -2.010***
(1.094) (0.684) (1.155) (0.746)
Cut-off point 2 2.548** 0.637 1.197 -0.841
(1.097) (0.680) (1.151) (0.733)
Cut-off point 3 3.334*** 1.424** 2.251* 0.204
(1.103) (0.684) (1.155) (0.733)
Cut-off point 4 5.566*** 3.659*** 4.365*** 2.298***
(1.127) (0.705) (1.172) (0.742)
N. of cases 421 421 394 394
City fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Source: 2009 survey.
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Explaining the outcome of land expropriations (hierarchal OLS model)
Satisfaction Satisfaction Interests Interests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balance of power (Measure 1) 0.902* 1.118***
(0.541) (0.373)
Balance of power (Measure 2) 0.450** 0.316***
(0.175) (0.120)
Cadre 0.300 0.303 0.435* 0.444*
(0.212) (0.212) (0.229) (0.229)
Party membership 0.073 0.070 0.055 0.047
(0.120) (0.120) (0.127) (0.127)
Major clan 0.278** 0.285** 0.101 0.102
(0.126) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125)
Household size -0.053 -0.055 0.009 0.005
(0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.044)
Non-agricultural employment 0.162 0.156 0.144 0.151
(0.122) (0.122) (0.126) (0.126)
Size of expropriated land -0.305** -0.301** -0.010 0.011
(0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.124)
Demolition 0.617*** 0.627*** 0.560*** 0.507***
(0.163) (0.156) (0.129) (0.126)
2006 -0.042 -0.057 -0.302* -0.305*
(0.161) (0.161) (0.160) (0.161)
2007 -0.130 -0.185 -0.191 -0.258
(0.181) (0.181) (0.169) (0.173)
2008 -0.045 -0.035 -0.048 -0.053
(0.205) (0.202) (0.173) (0.174)
Constant 2.479*** 2.767*** 2.578*** 3.109***
(0.401) (0.250) (0.309) (0.225)
N. of cases 421 421 394 394
Source: The 2009 survey.
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; the model controls for random effects at
the village level; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Explaining the process and outcome of land expropriation (without controls)
Satisfaction Interests Negotiation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit
Balance of power
(Measure 1)
2.064*** 1.410*** 0.653**
(0.562) (0.515) (0.255)
Balance of power
(Measure 2)
0.543*** 0.241* 0.128*
(0.143) (0.124) (0.066)
Constant 0.467 2.025*** 2.132*** 3.319***
(0.672) (0.391) (0.643) (0.397)
R-squared 0.221 0.221 0.176 0.167
N. of cases 421 421 394 394 432 432
City fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Source: 2009 survey.
Note: Marginal effects are reported for Logit regressions; robust standard errors are in parentheses
for OLS regressions; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
provincial and city governments constitute an exogenous factor that shapes the balance
of power of all villages within the same city. Therefore, they can serve as an instrumental
variable for the village power balance.
We do not have systematic data on how the balance of power within the village
leadership is regulated in each city. In response, we construct a proxy for the regulatory
environment of our sample cities regarding the balance of power. More specifically, we
use the average score of the balance of power among all sample villages within the same
city as the instrument for the main independent variable — balance of power. In other
words, the value of the instrument for each sample village is the average score of the
balance of power of all villages within the same city.
Two caveats should be noted about the instrumental variable approach. First, we have
two measures for the balance of power. We use Measure 1 in constructing our instrument
because in comparison with Measure 2, Measure 1 is more accurately measured and has
fewer measurement errors. The second caveat is that because the instrument is a constant
within the same city, we replace city-level fixed effects with regional-level fixed effects (i.e.,
Yangtze River Delta Area, Pearl River Delta Area, Chengdu-Chongqing Area, and Bohai
Bay Area).
We use the 2SLS method for the first two regressions where satisfaction and interest
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Table 10: Explaining the outcome of land expropriation (instrumental-variable approach)
Satisfaction Interest Negotiation
2SLS 2SLS IV-probit
Balance of power (Measure 1) 1.398** 1.458** 0.672**
(0.712) (0.741) (0.303)
Cadre 0.296 0.386* 0.161
(0.227) (0.226) (0.109)
Party membership 0.032 0.057 (0.046)
(0.126) (0.126) (0.057)
Major clan 0.307** 0.163 -0.017
(0.128) (0.127) (0.058)
Household size -0.067 0.025 0.034*
(0.044) (0.044) (0.020)
Non-agricultural employment 0.239* 0.154 -0.076
(0.127) (0.129) (0.057)
Size of expropriated land -0.282** 0.042 -0.049
(0.126) (0.126) (0.056)
Demolition 0.722*** 0.468*** 0.289***
(0.145) (0.147) (0.064)
2006 -0.220 -0.303* 0.009
(0.162) (0.160) (0.073)
2007 -0.258 -0.208 -0.103
(0.177) (0.175) (0.076)
2008 0.003 -0.081 0.074
(0.192) (0.187) (0.086)
Constant 2.022*** 2.497***
(0.499) (0.525)
N. of cases 421 394 432
Regional fixed effects YES YES YES
Source: 2009 survey.
Note: The instrumental variable is significant at the 1% level in the first stage of all three
regressions; Columns (1)-(2) report robust standard errors for 2SLS regressions; Columns (3)
reports the marginal effects and their standard errors for the IV-probit regression; * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
are the dependent variables, respectively, and use the IV-probit method to estimate the
third regression where the dependent variable negotiation is binary. We report the results
in Table 10. The instrumental variable is significant at the 1% level in the first stage of
all three regressions. The results are consistent with the results shown in Table 4.
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